Intermediation spread, bank supervision, and financial stability by Özyildirim, S.
December 21, 2010 13:18 WSPC/S0219-0915 155-RPBFMP S0219091510002050.tex
Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies
Vol. 13, No. 4 (2010) 517–537
c© World Scientific Publishing Co.
and Center for Pacific Basin Business, Economics and Finance Research
DOI: 10.1142/S0219091510002050
Intermediation Spread, Bank Supervision, and
Financial Stability
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This paper models the effect of bank competition and deposit insurance premiums
on the spread between lending and deposit rates. In developing economies, low
spreads do not always indicate bank efficiency; they may be the result of high
risk taking. This paper shows that imposing upper and lower limits on banks’
spreads and adjusting deposit insurance premiums when violation of these limits
occurs leads to a more stable but relatively large intermediation costs. In developing
economies, such an outcome would be considered more desirable because it insulates
existing financial intermediaries and investors against macroeconomic disturbances.
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1. Introduction
Despite the importance of the spread between lending and deposit rates in
the financial intermediation process, there are few theoretical and empir-
ical studies on how that spread is determined. In the literature, much of
the empirical work employs the dealership model originated by Ho and
Saunders (1981) and its extensions by Allen (1988) and Angbazo (1997). In
the work of Ho and Saunders, a bank is modeled as a dynamic dealer, setting
interest rates on loans and deposits to balance the asymmetric arrivals of
loan demands and deposit supplies. In that model, the main determinants
of intermediation spread have market structure and risk premium compo-
nents. Using a firm-theoretic approach, Wong (1997) finds similar evidence
that optimal bank spread reacts positively to an increase in market power,
credit risk, and interest rate risk. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) show that
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spreads vary widely within and across countries according to the degree of
bank competition in each country.
Narrow spreads often indicate a relatively competitive banking sec-
tor, with lower intermediation costs. However, especially in developing and
emerging markets, narrow spreads may not reflect the efficiency of financial
intermediaries instead high risk taking against defaults and macroeconomic
disturbances (Bethelemey and Varoudakis, 1996; Saunders and Schumacher,
2000; Koch, 2007). Laeven and Majnoni (2005) measure bank interest rate
spreads for 106 countries and find that while interest rate spreads vary typ-
ically between 2% and 4% in developed financial systems, they often reach
10% and more in developing countries. Even though a relatively large spread
between lending and deposit rates is purported to be better for solidifying a
banking system, especially in a developing economy, to our knowledge, there
has been no attempt to show explicitly the impact of regulatory practices on
bank spread behaviors. The main purpose of this study, then, is to construct
a model to analyze the determination of spread in a game-theoretical setting
and show the effect of using a deposit insurance scheme as a supervisory tool
to achieve larger but steadier intermediation spread profiles.
Modern banking regulation in most countries rests on three pillars: pru-
dent regulation supervision with capital adequacy rules, deposit insurance
with crisis management, and a regulatory framework that sets the rules for
competition among banks (Allen et al., 2001). Boot et al. (2001) argue that
the viability of the regulatory designs of minimum requirements for bank
capital necessitates a well-developed financial system and adequate inter-
nal control systems.1 Moreover, capitalization ratio serves as an effective
supervisory tool if changes in the market value of bank capital can be dif-
ferentiated from the accounting value. The banking problems in developing
countries in the 1990s indicated that capital requirements did not perform
their expected supervisory tool. As highlighted by Rojas-Suarez (2001a), the
year before the banking crises of 1991 in Sweden and Norway, and of 1994 in
Japan, real equity growth became negative. In contrast, on the eve of crises
in some developing countries (Argentina and Mexico in 1993, Ecuador in
1995, and Malaysia and Thailand in 1996), real equity growth reached very
high positive levels. Gorton and Winton (1998) examine transition economies
1There are even exceptions in the developed markets. For example, Flannery and Rangan
(2002) show that capital constraint was not binding at least for large banks in the 1990s
in the United States. Moreover, Drummond et al. (2007) find that increasing competition
in the loan and deposit markets in Italy did not materialize any efficiency gains in the
banking sector.
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and find that raising capital requirements may make the banking system less
risky at the cost of inefficiently small. Hence, adopting standards that are
based on the risk characteristics of developed countries may not easily work
for developing economies.
A risk-based deposit insurance premium is different than risk-based cap-
ital in that the premium explicitly prices risk rather than sets a standard.
Although it does not offer a direct incentive-compatible mechanism, the
risk-based premium system has some hidden potential if a bank has multi-
ple objectives in their optimal spread choice. As emphasized by Avery and
Belton (1987), it is very difficult to keep a bank’s insurance premium con-
fidential. Low-risk banks would have an incentive to advertise this fact and
it might also be best for the bank in the regulatory sense.
The deregulation of financial markets and consolidation of banks around
the globe in last two decade intensified the debates on the influences of
concentration and competition in the banking industry. This trend in the
banking industry has threatened the competitiveness of small or local banks.
While large banks can afford to invest in technology and branch networks
and offer services more convenient to the customer, small banks usually do
not have the resources to fund such improvements. In general, small banks
feel the competitive pressure of large banks both in the deposit and in the
loan markets (see for example Hoshino and Turnbull (2002)). Keeley (1990)
documents that the deregulation of the banking industry in the United
States in the 1970s and 1980s led to an increase in competition and a reduc-
tion in banks profits. This in turn greatly increased the incentive for banks
to undertake risk-taking behavior. Hellmann et al. (2000) show that with
increased competition in the banking sector, especially in the race to acquire
deposits, banks paying higher deposit rates gamble rather than practice
prudent lending.
Overall, we suggest that in managing banking risks, the supervisory
agency be allowed to set operating limits (upper and lower bounds) for bank
spreads, which would be used to adjust the insurance premium for each bank.
Thus, the examiner would endeavor to indirectly confine the movements
of intermediation spreads.2 The lower limit of the spread would indicate
the examiner’s opinion of the level considered to be unsustainable during
2As discussed by Pyle (1974), during a period of rapidly rising short-term interest rates,
Regulation Q resulted from concern regarding the solvency of savings and loans banks.
Although there may be similarities between our suggestion and Regulation Q, we do not
suggest that Regulation Q is better than competitive interest rates on deposit and loan
contracts.
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macroeconomic or financial shocks. A smaller spread, i.e., a smaller buffer,
would make banks more vulnerable against shocks. On the other hand, the
upper boundary specifies the credit risk forbearance of each bank. In theory,
competition should ensure that costs are minimized and prices of banking
services are such that resources are allocated efficiently. However, if banks
acquire market power, they can exploit it to charge higher interest on loans,
pay lower interest on deposits and it may distort savings and investment
decisions. Moreover, high interest rates that drive consumers and firms out
of the credit market may increase the adverse selection problem. We argue
that introducing such operation limits would bring more predictability and
stability to intermediation spread, especially in a developing country.
In the literature, few studies suggest monitoring interest rates to con-
trol bank risk taking. Allen and Gale (2004) propose that bank regulators
control bank spreads in order to limit possible inefficiencies resulting from
excessive risk taking. Morgan and Ashcraft (2003) find strong evidence that
lending rates were used to estimate the riskiness and future performance of
business loans in US banks from 1984 to 2001. They argue that supervisors
should consider using loan rates in their off-site surveillance, basing deposit
insurance premiums on loan interest rates instead of (or in addition to)
internal risk ratings. Using data for 3115 banks in 98 countries, Barth et al.
(2008) find that increasing information asymmetry between bank owners
and depositors or deposit insurers induces banks to shift more risk to depos-
itors by allowing higher interest margins. They suggest that government
regulation of banking sector should monitor these behaviors and establish
a deposit insurance system to protect depositors and preserve stability of
the banking system. Rojas-Suarez (2001b) documents evidence from sev-
eral emerging economies that market indicators such as interest rate paid
on deposits, spread between lending and deposit rates, and the rate of loan
growth are better at predicting banking problems than traditional indica-
tors such as capital-to-asset ratio, liquidity ratio, and/or equity prices. In a
simulation analysis, Barnhill et al. (2004) show that different levels of bank
credit risk, equity investment, bank-operating expenses, bank interest mar-
gin, and the future financial environments interact to determine bank risk
levels. Thus, they suggest that maintaining loan prices adequately above
credit costs (high intermediation spread) is crucial to maintain ultimately
solvency of the banks.
In this paper, in a multi-period Bertrand competition for deposits among
banks with different asset sizes, we show that if banking supervisory agencies
audit the intermediation spread of competing banks and punish banks by
adjusting deposit insurance premiums, banks may set intermediation spreads
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that insulate themselves against external and internal shocks. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the deposit rate-
setting game and its equilibriums under different deposit insurance schema.
Section 3 summarizes the numerical experiments on the determination of
optimal spreads and the merit of rate-based supervision. Section 4 concludes
the paper.
2. The Model
Consider an economy with a monopolistic banking sector in which small (s)
and large (l) banks compete to fund their loans with insured deposits. A
typical bank chooses a stream of deposit rates to maximize its discounted





δt{(1 − θit)RiLtLit(RiLt) − (RiDt + ρit)Dit(RiDt, RjDt)}, (1)
where i denotes small and large banks and δ is the common discount fac-
tor. Dit and L
i
t are deposit and loan contracts issued by bank i at time t,
respectively.
The deposit market is imperfect in the sense that the supply of deposit
contracts for a specific bank, Dit(RiDt, R
j
Dt) is monotonically increasing in
its own deposit interest rate, RiD, and decreasing in the rival bank’s deposit
rate, RjD (see Boyd and de Nicoló, 2005). It is also assumed that the sensi-
tivity of the supply of deposit contracts to interest rates by small and large







t . This can be explained by several reasons. For
example, large bank’s competitiveness may improve if depositors believe that
the government will treat these banks as “too big to fail”. In other words,
the perceived health of large banks presumably lowers the risk premiums
they pay on their deposits (Bassett and Brady, 2001; Tirapat, 2002).
In addition to deposit interest rate, banks pay an insurance premium,





t. Banks use deposits to extend loans, risky and oth-
erwise. It is assumed that loan contracts decline as lending rates increase, i.e.,
∂Lit/∂R
i
Lt < 0. Considering the fact that there is always a certain random
percentage of non-performing loans, θ, the actual value of loan payments to
bank i equals to (1 − θit)RiLtLit.3
3For simplicity, we assume that non-performing loans pay nothing to the bank as in
Taggart and Greenbaum (1978) and Wong (1997).
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In the absence of an interbank market, the summation of bank capital,
Ki, and the amount of deposits collected at each period, Dit, determine the
upper limit for funds allocated to loans (Barth et al., 2008). Intermediaries
behave like asset transformers since they borrow in advance of the realization
of uncertain loan demand (see Sealey, 1980; Deshmukh et al., 1983). Thus,
by choosing {RiDt; i = s, l}Tt=1, each bank knows the total funds available for
loan provisions. However, competition, especially in the deposit market, or
more precisely, the deposit-stealing game, drives the deposit rate up, which
may necessitate bank spread, RL − RD, to be more closely monitored in a
volatile macroeconomic conditions.
In the literature, there are models in which banks compete first for
deposits and then for loans (see for example, Yanelle, 1997). In this paper,
competition in the loan market is linked to competition in the deposit mar-
ket. Various explanations can be offered for assuming competition in the
loan market in this way. First, it is generally accepted that loans are not as
homogenous as deposits.4 Second, it can be argued that banks have actu-
ally been competing for a durable relationship in the loan market,5 but that
does not necessitate low loan prices. Greenbaum et al. (1989), Sharpe (1990),
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), and Zhu et al. (2009) provide theoretical
and empirical evidence that the interest rate charged on a loan increases
as the relationship lasts. Third, under an explicit and extensive deposit
insurance scheme, because the adverse selection problem in the loan market
becomes less important (Stein, 1998), there would be no risk in attempt-
ing to accumulate more insured deposits to be able to sell additional loans.
Thus, bank i announces the lending rate, RiL such that the expected value
of loan demand equals to the available source of funds, Dit +Ki. Since there
is a probability that actual loan demand, Li,dt , is below or above the avail-








t ≥ Dit +Ki)(Dit +Ki).6
4It can be argued that Certificates of Deposit (CDs) are not as homogenous as demand
deposits because CDs are uninsured source of funds for the banks. Yet, issuing CDs is not
easy for small banks due to information costs.
5Even though there is still controversy over the benefits of relationship lending, optimal
contracts under relationship lending allow for intertemporal arrangements, lowering aggre-
gate financing costs and reducing credit rationing (see Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe,
1990; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998).
6For simplicity, the cost of idle resources (Li,dt < D
i
t + K
i) and the benefit from excess
loan demand (Li,dt > D
i
t +K
i) are ignored in the profit function.
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The ratio of non-performing loans for a bank, θit, is described as a function





Lt), 0 ≤ θit ≤ 1, (2)
where h is any convex function in RL and θ̄it denotes the random default
rate, which is independent of the level of lending. In Equation (2), a higher
interest rate suggests a higher default premium for the borrower.
In this economy, the deposit insurance agency determines the insurance
premiums and manages the deposit insurance fund. The compulsory deposit
insurance premium, ρit, is determined as follows:
ρit =
{
ρ+ ψ1(θit−1) + ψ2(µit−1), if µit−1 /∈ [µ, µ̄]
ρ+ ψ1(θit−1), otherwise.
(3)
In addition to the flat rate, ρ, the insurance premium for bank i is adjusted
to the risk exposures of that bank at the end of each period. First, the actual
premium increases with an increase in non-performing loans (∂ψ1/∂θit−1 >
0). Second, the bank pays a higher premium to the insurance fund when the
chosen lending and deposit rates cause the spread, µi(= RiL−RiD)7 to signal
increased risks for bank i. To be more specific, when the spread is above a
certain upper limit, µ̄, it will be considered an indication of high risk taking
by the bank. Similarly, when the spread is below a certain level, µ, the bank
is considered to be exposed to both interest rate risk and credit risk. Thus,
when the previous period’s spread violates the pre-specified operating limits
or surveillance band, i.e., µit−1 /∈ [µ, µ̄], the insurance premium increases by
ψ2. In this paper, the supervisory agency is modeled to achieve macroeco-
nomic stability and prudent banking practices by monitoring the intermedi-
ation cost of each bank over time (see also Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Using
data from 71 countries, Pasiouras et al. (2006) show that banks in coun-
tries where deposit insurer has more power to intervene or to take an action
against risk taking have higher ratings. In a static framework, Matutes and
Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002) explore the impact of compe-
tition for deposits on risk-taking behavior under different deposit insurance
schema. In particular, Cordella and Yeyati (2002) emphasize the role of the
7Since supervisors are assumed to monitor the previous period’s prices for loan and deposit
contracts, these rates are effectively not ex ante (or contract) interest rates. Even though
there might be practical difficulties with monitoring and regulating spreads, Barajas et al.
(1999), for example, mention the Colombian Banking Superintendency, which collects
information on lending and deposit rates for all banks on the last week of each month as
a way of supervision.
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deposit insurance agency on managing the qualities of banks’ portfolios.
They show that by charging risk-based insurance premiums, banks would
be disciplined in competitive banking environments. This paper will uti-
lize a similar argument but a different scheme to adjust deposit insurance
premiums.
3. Equilibrium Under Different Insurance Schema
The Bertrand equilibrium of the deposit game described in Section 2 is
determined when each bank chooses its profit-maximizing deposit rate based
on expectations of the rival’s rate under given deposit insurance system. In
the flat rate, ρ, deposit insurance scheme, an optimal stream of deposit rates




















where i = s, l and t = 1, . . . , T.8
Equation (4) is an implicit function that defines the profit-maximizing
levels of deposit rates, {RiDt}Tt=1 for any given deposit rate of rival bank,
{RjDt}Tt=1. Solving Equation (4) for RiDt gives bank i’s reaction function,
RiD(R
j
D). In an analogous manner, the reaction function for bank j defines
RjD(R
i
D). The intersection of two reaction functions yields the equilibrium
levels of deposit rates for small and large banks,9 {Ri∗Dt; i = s, l}Tt=1, under
a flat rate insurance scheme.
Spread- and/or Risk-Adjusted Premium:
In the case where the deposit insurance agent adjusts the deposit premium
of each bank according to the bank’s non-performing loan rate and inter-
mediation spread in the previous period, ρit = ρ + ψ1(θit−1) + ψ2(µit−1),
8The choice of deposit rate, RiDt, will affect loan sales and the proportion of non-



















i = s, l. Moreover, the lending rate and the available fund for credits depend on the


























9See, for example, De Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991) for derivations of the Nash equi-
librium in a dynamic games setting.
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, for i = s, l, t = 1, . . . , T.
Similar to the derivation of the equilibrium in the flat rate model, the
reaction functions using Equation (5) and a simultaneous solution of these
equations yield the optimal deposit rates for small and large banks under
spread-based and/or risk-based premium schema.
3.1. Derivation of intermediation spread
To determine the optimal spread profiles, {µi∗t ; i = s, l}Tt=1, first, the non-
cooperative deposit game between small and large banks is solved. From
the equilibrium deposit rates, {Rs∗Dt, ;Rl∗Dt}Tt=1, the amount of deposit sup-
plied, Di∗t (Ri∗Dt, ;R
j∗




i = s, l can be calculated. As described in the model, loans are sold at a rate,
RiLt, where the loan demand, L
i,d
t , and supply, D
i∗
t +K





t + Ki, or RiLt = f
−1(Di∗t + Ki). Thus, the difference
between the announced loan rate and the optimal deposit rate would be the
optimal spread, µi∗t (= RiLt −Ri∗Dt), for bank i at time t.
In the solution procedure described above, it is assumed that banks
choose their respective plans at an initial date. This class of equilibrium can
be argued to be appropriate for games in the deposit market. The empirical
evidence shows that prices are mostly rigid in the deposit market. Numerous
explanations are offered for the existence of price stickiness: For example,
Hannan and Berger (1991) look to menu costs. Their result shows that if
there is a cost to changing a bank’s interest rate (menu cost), then changes
are made only when the rates are out of line enough to make it worth the
menu cost. They also find that deposit rates are significantly more rigid
when deposit bank interest rates are increasing.
A number of papers modeling strategic interaction in the banking indus-
try consider the Cournot (see Hannan and Berger, 1991; Montgomery, 1991)
or Bertrand competition (see Yannelle, 1997; Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999). For
our purpose, since spread is the main variable to be monitored by supervisory
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agents, the Bertrand model is more appropriate. As far as the financial indus-
try is concerned, previous empirical results generally confirm that it is very
hard to maintain a monopolistic position in the financial market (Tufano,
1989; Britran and Lojo, 1993). Once a company promotes a new product (or
price) other competitors could not only copy it immediately but also invent
a better product (or offer a better price), because they have time to learn
the strengths and weaknesses of the product. From the very few studies that
examine other game structures such as the Stackelberg competition, Zhou
et al. (2009) found an unexpected result: state-owned banks in China are
acting as followers to improve social welfare.
4. Numerical Analysis of Equilibrium
4.1. Calibration of the model
To derive the time paths of spreads for small and large banks, we calibrate
the model and numerically examine the effect of the proposed supervision
of banks. To study the role of the deposit insurance premium on achieving
stable bank spread behavior, first, it is assumed that deposit supply function
is simply linear: Dit = αi+βiR
i
Dt−γiRjDt, where αl = 20, αs = 10, βl = 4000,
βs = 3000, γl = 300, and γs = 600.10 It is assumed that large banks are
less sensitive to changes in deposit rates compared to small banks because
they have more capacity for loan sales. Moreover, they are assumed to be
less cross-price elastic.
Loan demand is characterized as Lit = (RiLt)
a, where a = −0.30.11 Banks
are assumed to be confronted with stochastic arrivals of borrowers that







for Ldt = 0, 1, . . . ,
where λt = Dt +K and the expected loan demand, E[Ldt ], equals λt. In the
numerical experiments, the integer values of loan demands with a mean of
Dit +Ki are generated using the algorithm described in Knuth (1981).
The flat rate deposit insurance premium is set at 0.05 (5% of the
deposits supplied). On top of this rate, the actual premium increases with
the existence of non-performing loans, such that ψ1 = 0.5θit−1. The upper
10See Barro (1976) and Fry (1988) for the selection of certain parameters on deposit and
loan functions and the constant default rate.
11Note that the interest rate elasticity of loan demand is assumed to be constant, whereas
the interest rate elasticity of deposit supply changes over RiD.
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and lower operating limits for bank spreads are chosen as µ = 0.10 and
µ̄ = 0.25 especially to see how the model will perform in less-developed
and more volatile macroeconomic environments. If the last period’s spread
of any bank is within the specified limits, the actual premium for deposit
insurance would be ρit = 0.05 + 0.5θ
i
t−1. Otherwise, i.e., µit /∈ [µ̄, µ], banks
would have to pay an additional flat rate of 3% (ψ2 = 0.03) to the deposit





where h is a linear for simplicity. θ̄it is generated as a uniform random devi-
ate between 3% and 5%. Θ is an indicator function that equals one if the
loan rate is above a certain threshold rate, Rimax, and equals zero otherwise.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) call Rmax the bank-optimal lending rate because it
is the interest rate at which the expected return to the bank is maximized.
Rimax is 0.15 for both types of banks. Other parameters are δ = 0.98, and
the surveillance horizon, T is 30 periods (for example, 30 days or 30 weeks).
4.2. Numerical results
Figures 1–5 illustrate the optimal time profiles of intermediation spread
under flat rate versus adjusted-rate premium schema. In Figure 1, it is































































Fig. 1. Spread profiles for flat rate (ρ = 0.05) versus adjusted-rate premiums where
dotted lines indicate large banks.
December 21, 2010 13:18 WSPC/S0219-0915 155-RPBFMP S0219091510002050.tex
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Table 1. Mean values for spread, deposit, and loan rates.
Adjusted-Rate Premium (ρit)
ψ2 ψ2 = 0.03, µ = 0.1
ρ 0.01 0.03 0.05 µ̄ = 0.2 µ̄ = 0.3
µl 0.1778 0.2432 0.2300 0.2281 0.2545 0.2414
(0.0389) (0.0301) (0.0187) (0.0158) (0.0342) (0.0284)
µs 0.1875 0.2643 0.2265 0.2282 0.2965 0.2488
(0.0333) (0.0519) (0.0250) (0.0244) (0.0473) (0.0250)
RlD 0.0381 0.0155 0.0186 0.0190 0.0129 0.01600
(0.0120) (0.0064) (0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0082) (0.0069)
RsD 0.0459 0.02116 0.02943 0.02896 0.01433 0.02303
(0.0140) (0.0106) (0.0087) (0.0070) (0.0091) (0.0060)
RlL 0.2159 0.2587 0.2486 0.2471 0.2674 0.2573
(0.0272) (0.0238) (0.0137) (0.0114) (0.0264) (0.0217)
RsL 0.2334 0.2855 0.2560 0.2572 0.3108 0.2718
(0.0197) (0.0419) (0.0165) (0.0175) (0.0388) (0.0192)
Note : Standard deviations in parentheses.
observed that spread volatility for both types of banks decreases for higher
values of ψ2. When the optimal spreads deviate from the operating limits
a higher compensating premium on the flat rate yields less intertemporal
volatility of intermediation costs. However, this adjustment on the deposit
insurance premium scheme increases the overall levels of optimal spreads.
In Table 1, the mean values and the standard deviations of intermedia-
tion prices, {RiD, RiL; i = s, l} and the spreads for both types of banks are
reported for the insurance schemes of flat rate versus adjusted rate.
As seen from Figure 2, intermediation prices change significantly when
banks compete for deposits under the system where spreads are closely mon-
itored by the supervisory agent. In the insurance system where the risk-
adjusted premium might be 3% more than the flat rate (=ψ2), it is observed
that both types of banks decrease their deposit rates as well as increase their
loan rates. Thus, the optimal spread profiles of small and large banks move
to higher levels, even closer to µ̄ (see Figure 1). Therefore, the relatively
tight regulation suggested in this paper brings a more stable movement of
optimal spreads, albeit lower intermediation benefits, to the banks’ potential
users. Even though the competitive outcomes are expected to yield higher
deposit rates and lower loan rates, the opposite behavior is observed in both
the deposit and the loan markets. Despite the deposit-stealing game among
banks, the outcome of the non-cooperative deposit game described herein
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Fig. 2. Loan and deposit rates over time in the case of flat rate versus adjusted-rate
premiums (dotted lines) where ψ2 = 0.03.
results in the contraction of the loanable funds. Moreover, declining avail-
able funds in the banking sector are sold at higher prices, thus the optimal
spreads expand for both types of banks. Nevertheless, the general result
of the model that suggests higher spreads for both types of banks is more
desirable in terms of insulating banks from potential shocks.
We posit that the deposit insurance premium for each bank is fur-
ther adjusted whenever a bank chooses net interest margins on deposits
and loans beyond the operating band for intermediation spread. Obviously,
the width of this band may have an impact on the behavior of compet-
ing intermediaries. In order to explore this relationship, the same deposit
game, imposing narrower [0.1, 0.20] and wider [0.1, 0.30] bands for the bank
spreads, is numerically demonstrated (Figure 3). It is apparent that what-
ever the width, it would not be optimal for each bank to increase its deposit
rates since premiums are calculated on the amount of deposits. As may also
be seen from Table 1, on average, both types of banks collect less money
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Fig. 3. Spread profiles for benchmark case with different pre-specified bands. Dotted lines
represent the benchmark band of 0.10 ≤ µ ≤ 0.25.
with lower deposit rates and sell these loanable funds at higher prices in
the credit market. More specifically, when the band is narrow, none of the
banks is able to offer a spread within the band. Thus, the introduction
of an unattainable upper limit causes more volatile and larger spreads for
both banks. In the model, bank managers who try to avoid additional insur-
ance premium payments reduce deposit collection attempts by offering lower
deposit rates. Consequently, both loan rates and intermediation spreads of
all banks will increase. In the experiment where there is a wider operating
band, we obtain results similar to the benchmark case. However, the level
and volatility of banks’ spreads increase when the band widens (see also
Table 1). Still, the close surveillance practice of using an operational band
with an upper limit of 0.30 (=µ̄) produces less volatile spread profiles than
no band.
We also numerically analyze the effect of banks’ credit-risk management
efforts on spreads. In particular, we concentrate on the credit-rationing
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Fig. 4. Spread profiles for flat rate deposit insurance system are represented by dotted
lines.
parameters of the model, Rmax and h. For higher values of bank-optimal
loan rates such as Rmax = 0.20 and 0.25, similar results are observed: that
adjusted premium schema based on bank interest margins and credit risk
bring more stable, but larger, spreads to the banking sector (Figure 4). If a
bank increases its optimal loan rate, the credit-risk management strategy of
credit rationing might be relaxed to a certain extent. Since a bank’s expec-
tation of default risk below this new rate is decreased, the bank will attempt
to sell more loans. Hence, the attempts to collect more loanable funds will
increase deposit rates, especially for competing banks. However, banks will
decrease loan rates in order to sell these collected funds. Thus, the spread
between deposit and loan rates would decline based on the change in the
bank’s judgment of its optimal loan rate. In the experiment that Rmax is
20%, on average, the spread for a large (small) bank is 0.2195 (0.2104) with a
standard deviation of 0.02251 (0.02866). Increasing Rmax to 25% lowers the
mean values of spread for both types of banks. For the large (small) bank,
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Fig. 5. Spread profiles for flat rate deposit insurance system are represented by dotted
lines.
the mean spread is 0.2139 (0.2185) and the standard deviation is 0.02145
(0.02674).
Finally, lowering or ignoring the adjustment parameter of credit
rationing, h yields similar spread profiles when the flat- and adjusted-
premium schemata are compared (Figure 5). The mean values of spreads
and the volatility over time increase with respect to the result in the bench-
mark case. Specifically, in the experiment where h = 0.1, it is found that for
the large (small) bank, the mean spread is 0.2139 (0.2185) and the standard
deviation is 0.02145 (0.02674). For h = 0, the mean value of spread for the
large (small) bank is 0.2195 (0.2104) and the standard deviation is 0.02251
(0.02866). A similar explanation is valid for the change in spread behaviors
of both banks. Again, bank management’s decreasing expectation of default
increases the amount of loans supplied at each period. As this behavior may
result in collecting more loanable funds and selling them at lower prices, the
difference between loan and deposit rates shrinks.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, a stylized model is introduced to further understand the opti-
mal determination of intermediation spread profiles in the competitive envi-
ronment of banking. In the literature, it has been recognized that spreads
between lending and deposit rates vary within and across countries accord-
ing to the degree of bank competition in each country. In order to consider
the banking structure in a specific economy, a multi-period noncooperative
Bertrand deposit game played between small and large banks is constructed.
Banks collecting deposits from investors price these funds to meet uncertain
loan demands. The outcome of this game determines the optimal spreads
for different types of banks over a finite time horizon. The main argument
in this study is that higher or lower bank interest margins indicate credit
and/or interest rate risks that should be supervised closely to obtain a more
stable banking sector. It is shown that competition between small and large
banks and imposing lower and upper limits on spreads lead to predictable
spreads but less intermediation benefits, over time.
Although increasing bank spreads can be considered as an indication
of inefficient financial intermediation, there are some desirable features.
Barajas et al. (1999) point out that while a high level of spread is gen-
erally indicative of inefficiency, excessive risk taking, or lack of competition
within the banking sector, it is also true that high spread can contribute to
high bank earnings, which, if channeled into the system’s capital base, may
promote safety and stability.
Due to tractability, we have relied on various assumptions and parame-
ters. Hence, it would be interesting to relax some of these assumptions for
future research. For example, one can introduce a third player, a supervisor
to the model. The supervisor may optimally choose a regulating rule accord-
ing to the preferences described, namely the weights given to volatility and
level of spread to maximize social welfare. In a three-period model, Chiang
et al. (2007) show that optimum risk-based premium rate that is determined
by the insurance agency reduces banks’ choices of taking risk and raises the
expected social welfare. However, Chu (2003) finds that social welfare gains
disappear in the long run because deposit insurance schemes result in mis-
allocation of resources due to increased banking regulations. Moreover, he
shows that the derivation of the welfare implication of a deposit insurance
scheme suffers from complexity in institutional and regulatory environment
in addition to time dimensions. Hence, the welfare implications of increased
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regulation and reduced volatility of intermediation costs need a different
dynamic setting.
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